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FLORIDA NOTES
GRAND JURY REPORT CENSURING AN ATTORNEY
WITHOUT INDICTMENT*
Facts: An attorney at law accused an assistant state's attorney of
using perjured testimony and of other wrongdoings in the prosecution
of a case against his client, and requested a grand jury investigation.
The grand jury returned its report denying any wrongdoings and concluded that the charges made by the attorney and his client were baseless
and unwarranted, constituting an attempt to cast suspicion upon the
integrity of the grand jury and the office of the state's attorney. The
report further suggested that the bar association conduct an investigation
and provided for copies of the report to be furnished to all news media
in Dade County. The attorney then moved to expunge certain portions of
the report, which he alleged impugned his motives and held him up to
scorn and criticism. The circuit court denied the motion to expunge. On
appeal to the district court, held, affirmed: "We recognize that the great
weight of authority and the rule followed in this state is that a grand jury
has no authority to make a report criticizing individuals. We believe that
where, as in this instance, the appellant was the moving party who initiated the proceedings after apparently giving his charges some publicity,
a different rule applies." Rubin v. Interim Report of Dade County Grand
Jury, 159 So.2d 918, 919 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
Annotator's Comments: The majority of jurisdictions have held that
it is not the function of a grand jury to single out, condemn, defame or
castigate an individual by name or innuendo without the issuance of an
indictment.' Prior to the decision in the instant case Florida had followed
this majority position. 2 Thus, it has been held that the grand jury cannot
by its presentments, stigmatize an individual, without allowing him the
opportunity of a defense under the procedural safeguards of a trial.8
Nevertheless, some exceptions to this general rule have been recog* The author wishes to express his appreciation for the collaboration rendered by
Miguel A. Suarez in preparation of this article.
1. Application of United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y.
1953) ; State v. Interim Report of Grand Jury, 93 So.2d 99 (Fla. 1957). See also The Grand
Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HARv. L. REv. 590 (1961).

2. In State v. Clemmons, 150 So.2d 231 (Fla. 1963) the Supreme Court noted at

page 234:

The Grand Jury is not authorized to investigate the private affairs of individuals
and it should not single out public officials for scurrilous condemnation without

accompanying indictment.
State v. Interim Report of Grand Jury, 93 So.2d 99 (Fla. 1957); Owens v. State, 59 So.2d
254 (Fla. 1952). See also In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Fla. 154, 11 So.2d 316 (Fla.
1943); Grand Jury Presentments; Protection oj the Vindicated, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 330
(1959).
3. Ryon v. Shaw, 77 So.2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1955).
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nized.4 The court in the instant case based its decision on one such exception, namely, that "he brought it on himself." 5 However, the facts in
Rubin add a new ingredient to this exception, in that the attorney requested the grand jury investigation while in the process of representing
a client.6 Other jurisdictions have rejected completely the "he brought
it on himself" exception.7 When the grand jury acts beyond the scope of
its authority, it is proper to order the report expunged, but it should be
noted that this remedy is of little curative value since in most cases the
damage already has been done.'
In Florida, disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme court. 9 It has been held that the
4. Ryon v. Shaw, 77 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1955) ; Owens v. State, 59 So.2d 254 (Fla. 1952);
In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Fla. 154, 11 So.2d 316 (Fla. 1943); Hayslip v. State,
193 Tenn. 643, 249 S.W.2d 882 (1952). All jurisdictions prohibit a report which contains no
more than a mere opinion. See, e.g., Matter of Crosby, 126 Misc. 250, 213 N.Y. Supp. 86
(Sup. Ct. 1925).

5. The first decision to apply an exception to the censure of an individual who initiates

an investigation was Ex parte Cook, 199 Ark. 1187, 137 S.W.2d 248 (1940). This exception

was followed in Application of Knight, 28 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1941) and Hayslip v.
State, 193 Tenn. 643, 249 S.W.2d 882 (1952), in which the court noted at pages 884-85:
Under such circumstances the movant to expunge having initiated the proceedings
after publicizing them was in no position to object to the result of the investigation ....
[I]t should become a discretionary matter for the trial court, as to whether or not
the report or portions thereof . :. are expunged.
6. In Ex parte Cook, supra note 5, the petitioner had sought to be nominated for
governor and as an offshoot of the election requested the investigation. In Application ol
Knight, supra note 5, an attorney requested a grand jury investigation alleging the mismanagement of an estate, but apparently he was not acting in a professional capacity while
representing a client affected by such acts. In Hayslip v. State, supra note 5, the petitioner
made public accusations concerning immoral practices at a public school, charging that the
public officials permitted such acts allegedly committed by persons under the age of legal
consent.
7. Ex parte Burns, 77 So.2d 912 (Ala. 1954); In re Grand Jury Report, 152 Md. 616,
137 At. 370 (1927); In re Healey, 161 Misc. 582, 293 N.Y. Supp. 584 (1937). See also the
dissent of Chief Justice Neil in Hayslip v.- State, 193 Tenn. 643i 249 S.W.2d 882 (1952). In
Ex parte Faulkner, 221 Ark. 637, 251 S.W.2d 882 (1952), the court was concerned with a
petition by members of a schoolboard for a grand jury investigation of school affairs. The
grand jury presentment castigated Faulkner, a member of the board, because he made
irresponsible statements. The court held, at page 824:
It would seem that the weight of authority supports the proposition that it is
improper for a Grand Jury to present with words of censure and reprobation a
public official or other person by name without presenting him for indictment ....
8. Clein v. State, 52 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1950). See also People v. McCabe, 148 Misc. 330,
266 N.Y. Supp. 363, 367 (1933), where the court commented:
A presentment is a foul blow. It wins the importance of a judicial document; yet
it lacks its principal attributes-the right to answer and to appeal. No one knows
upon what evidence the findings are based. An indictment may be challenged-even
defeated. The presentment is immune. It is like a hit and run motorist. Before
application can be made to suppress it, it is the subject of public gossip. The damage
is done. The injury it may injustly inflict may never be healed.
Florida seems to follow People v. McCabe, supra, when attorneys are involved. See State Bar
v. Nichols, 151 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1963) and State v. Interim Report of Grand Jury, 93 So.2d
99 (Fla. 1957). See also Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment": Foul Blow or Fair Play?
55 CoLum. L. REV. 1102, 1112 (1955); The Grand Jury-Its Investigatory Powers and
Limitations, 37 Mum. L. REV. 586, 604 (1953).
9. State v. Clemmons, 150 So.2d 231 (Fla. 1963); State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Calhoon,
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Board of Governors of the Florida Bar Association and the local grievance committees are agents of the supreme court,1 ' and that all disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are confidential. 1 Thus, it would
appear that the mandate of the grand jury's report in the instant case
"that the bar association conduct an investigation" is contrary to its
later order "that copies of the report be furnished to .. .all news media
in Dade County."12

Attorneys in Florida are sworn to observe the Canons of Ethics
adopted by the supreme court of Florida. Canon 15"s states that the
lawyer "owes entire devotion to the interest of the client . .

. No fear

of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity should restrain him . ..."
Canon 29"4 provides that the "counsel upon the trial of a cause in which
perjury has been committed owes it to the profession and to the public
to bring the matter to the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities."
in the instant case, the attorney, during the course of his representation of a client, charged the prosecution with using perjured testimony.
Thus, by stating his belief that there has been perjured testimony pursuant to the standards prescribed by the canons, the Florida attorney
risks having his professional reputation injured by a possible criticism
from the grand jury if it finds the evidence insufficient to warrant an
indictment."
If the supreme court grants certiorari in the instant case it will have
to choose between two alternatives: (1) following the district court's
decision, or (2) reaffirming State ex rel. Brautigam v. Interim Report of
102 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1958), in which the court noted that the lawyer is an essential component of the administration of justice; State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Evans, 94 So.2d 730 (Fla.
!957) ; Application of Harper, 84 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1956) ; INTEGRATTON R. FLA. BAR, art. XT

10. State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Rubin, 142 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1962).
1H. INTEGRAION R. FLA. BAR, art. XI, § 5(h). See also Murreli v. Florida Bar, 122 So.2d
69 (Fla. 1960) ; Dade County Bar Ass'n President's & State Attorney's Special Comm.. 116
So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1959), where the court commented:
Mc
reover, traditional concepts of due process and 'air play, socrimportant
scheme of government clearly comprehend a full and complete investigation before
charges are preferred against an officer of the court. In the profession of law, a good
reputation is the practitioner's most valuable asset.
'2.Rubin v.Interim Report of Grand Jury, '59 S.2d 9.8, 9i9 (Fa.3d Dist. 1964).
13. CODE OF ETHIcs-RULE B, § 1.

14. Ibid.
15. In Hayslip v. State, 193 Tenn. 643, 249 S.W.2d 882, 885 (1952) Chief Justice Neil
noted in his dissenting opinion:
Every citizen who now voluntarily goes before the Grand Jury and undertakes to
give it any information relating to criminal misconduct does so at the peril of being
defamed, in an official report, when the evidence is not deemed sufficient upon which
to have an indictment.
If the above statement is true as applied to an individual, it is even more on point when
applied to an attorney in Florida, who is sworn to follow Canons 15 and 29 as well as the
additional CoDE OF ETcs-RuLE B, § II,which states that no person admitted to practice
law in Florida should "fail to offer to exclude, or omit to disavow, disclaim, and seek the
elimination, from the case of any false or forged evidence or testimony, promptly upon
learning that it is false or forged."
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Grand Jury, 6 which, in discussing the effect of a report on an attorney,
held: "It is stated that the report does not charge the principals with a
crime ....

But it at least convicted them ...

inevitably blackening their

reputations and destroying them in their profession."'
It is submitted that grand jury reports which criticize the conduct
of attorneys should be carefully scrutinized before their release to the
public, since the duty of an attorney to his client might well be misconstrued by the ordinary layman sitting on a grand jury. In all cases, the
Bar Association should be an active participant prior to any public release
of findings by the grand jury. In any event, the following disturbing
questions remain unanswered:
(1) Should the grand jury have authority to file reports criticizing individuals without indictment, by virtue of its function
to protect the public interest? And, should not such authority
emanate from the legislature?
(2) In the event that Florida follows the "he brought on himself" exception, should the report be automatically expunged
if the Florida Bar Association exonerates the attorney?
(3) Since the publication of a grand jury report criticizing an
attorney is tantamount, in effect, to a public reprimand, should
not this disciplinary measure be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Florida Bar Association as an arm of the supreme
court?

WILLS-POWER TO DESIGNATE CHARITIES GIVEN TO
EXECUTORS MAY BE EXERCISED BY,

ADMINISTRATOR C.T.A.
Facts: The testatrix provided for a bequest of four thousand dollars
to a home for boys and an equal sum to a home for crippled children.
The homes were to be selected and designated by the executors of the
estate, who were appointed in another clause of the will. The county
judge's court found that one of the executors had died and the other was
ineligible to serve, and appointed an administrator c.t.a. The court also
appointed a guardian ad litem who was to represent the unknown charities. The residuary beneficiaries contested the authority of the administrator c.t.a. to select charities, alleging that the power granted in the will
was personal. The court found that the power was given to the executors
virtute officii. On appeal the district court, held, affirmed: "The testatrix
has evinced a general charitable intent. There is nothing in the will to
16. 93 So.2d 99 (Fla. 1957).
17. Id. at 102.
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indicate that the testatrix intended that only the two persons named
should make the selection and designation of the particular homes to
benefit from the will." In re Serrill's Estate, 159 So.2d 246, 249 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1964).
Annotator's Comments: In each decision involving the legal effect
of a testamentary clause granting to the executor some choice as to distribution, there are two steps in the process of analysis. The court will

first classify the clause as creating or attempting to create either a trust,

power, or gift.1 Having chosen the class which applies, the court will
then proceed to give effect to the testamentary disposition solely in terms
of the law governing that class. A bequest or devise of property to an
executor is presumed to be 2made to him in his official capacity in the
form of a power, or in trust.
There is no doubt that the use of the trust permits the executor to
select the ultimate takers, but if the devise were interpreted as lacking
a definite beneficiary it would be invalid8 and the property would pass
to the residuary legatees.4 On the other hand, the creation of a discretionary power of appointment does not impose the requirement that the
beneficiaries be definite, and thus clearly could be employed to carry out
the testator's intent; 5 but this renders discretionary the exercise of the
power, and thereby fails to impose upon the executor the obligation to
make a selection. 6 If the power is coupled with a duty to exercise it, a
power in trust is created, and consequently is subject to the definite beneficiary requirement.7 In order to carry out fully the testator's wishes, the
executor must be obligated to exercise the power of selection, yet as a
trust or a power in trust (which are the only vehicles for imposing the
obligation), the devise may be totally void for want of a definite beneficiary. In such cases, the devise may be valid only if interpreted as a
power, in which case the applicable law does not require that the executor
1. Scott, Trusts for Charitable and Benevolent Purposes, 58 Hav. L. REV. 548 (1945);
Devise to Executor for Further Distribution-Applicationof Trust and Power Doctrines, 56
MICH. L. Rxv. 1167 (1958).
2. Thomas v. Anderson, 245 Fed. 642 (8th Cir. 1917); Tunis v. Dale, 97 N.H. 420, 89
A.2d 760 (1952); In re Brown's Estate, 122 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1953); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 323, comment e (1940). Cases on this point are collected in 104 A.L.R. 114 (1936), and in
151 A.L.R. 1438 (1944).
3. Hazard v. Bacon, 42 R.I. 415, 108 Atl. 499 (1920); Markhom v. Tibbets, 79 F. Supp.
47 (S.D.N.Y. 1947)
4. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 323, comment e (1940).

5. Watt's Estate, 202 Pa. 85, 51 Ad. 588 (1902); In re Rowland's Estate, 73 Ariz. 337,
241 P.2d 781 (1952).
6. Clark v. Campbell, 82 N.H. 281, 133 At. 166 (1926); In re Rowland's Estate, 73
Ariz. 337, 241 P.2d 781 (1952).
7. The trust will be valid only if the testator has met the requirements imposed in the
case of Morice v. The Bishop of Durham, 10 Ves. 522, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (1805), that is,
by designating a definite trust beneficiary. Failure in this respect totally invalidates the
devise, and the executor is said to hold the corpus on a resulting trust for the heirs or next
of kin of the testator. See Tunis v. Dole, 97 N.H. 420, 89 A.2d 760 (1952).
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exercise his discretion. This is the interpretation adopted by the court
in the instant case."
It should be noted that the approved revision of the Restatement of
Trusts allows the trustee to carry out the terms of a trust made unenforceable, either because it is for an indefinite class of beneficiariesor because it is for an indefinite purpose, provided that ( 1) the trustee is directed
or authorized by the terms of the trust to select the ultimate takers from
the class or the purpose, and (2) the class or the purpose are not entirely indefinite.' Some courts have allowed the executor to select the trust
beneficiaries, when the devise gave sufficient directions so that the
court could determine whether a given selectee came within the named
purposes.' ° However, the majority of jurisdictions have failed to accept
the Restatement view.
Charities are given different treatment." When a clear intention is
expressed that a fund or other property shall be given to charity, it is held
to be immaterial that the objects are not defined. The principle is
that the court treats charity as the substance, while the particular disposition is considered the mode of the gift. A distinction is drawn between
the general charitable intention, which must be clear, and the mode of
executing it, which, though vague and indefinite, does not affect the
validity of the gift. 12 A power to determine the particular object to be
benefitted may be delegated; thus a bequest to a definite class of charitable objects, coupled with the appointment of a person to select the
objects, is not void for uncertainty..
The Florida courts do recognize the cy pres doctrine. However, there
was no necessity to refer to it in the instant case. According to the cy pres
doctrine, when a testator manifests in his will a general charitable intention as well as a specific charitable purpose which cannot be executed in
8. In re Serrill's Estate, 159 So.2d 246, 248 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). But see Ames, The
Failure of the Tilden Trust, 5 HARV. L. REv. 389, 395 (1892) in which the author commented that an unenforceable trust might nevertheless be given limited legal effect. Ames'
doctrine is intended to apply only to the case where the class is partially definite; in such
event, the executor is permitted to appoint solely persons whom the court determines to
fall definitely within the class. See also Dulle's Estate, 218 Pa. 162, 67 AtI. 49 (1907) ; In re
Gestetner Settlement, 1 ch. 672 (1953).
9. RESTATEMENT SECOND, TRUsTS §§ 1 122, 123 (1957).
10. Cochran v. McLaughlin, 128 Conn. 638, 24 A.2d 836 (1942); Feinberg v. Feinberg,
131 A.2d 658 (Del. Ch. 1957); Dulle's Estate, 218 Pa. 162, 67 Atl. 49 (1907). But see
Dormer Estate, 348 Pa. 356, 35 A.2d 299 (1944) in which two executors were found to
have a power which was general, except that they could not appoint to themselves. Unfortunately, the court held that upon the death of one executor the power was destroyed.
11. Where the power of selection of the beneficiaries is attached to the office rather than
to individuals selected by the testator as his executors, the power may be carried out by
anyone who acts as executor. 10 AM. JUR. Charities § 31 (1937). See also RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 318, comment k (1940), and RESTATEMENT, TRusTS § 396 (2d ed. 1959).
12. WmLLIAmS, THE LAW RELATING To WiLLs 651 (2d ed. 1961).

13. Id. at 658 ("Delegation of Power to Determine Objects").
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accordance with the exact terms prescribed in the will, the courts will
apply the trust to carry out the testator's intent as nearly as possible, consistent with the specific charitable purpose.1 4 In essence, the doctrine as
applied to charitable gifts is one of approximation and liberal interpretation, designed to save the gift for charity and at the same time to carry
out the charitable intent of the donor.15
In the instant case, the court was not called upon to deal with the
problems of the uncertain beneficiary, since the ultimate recipient was
a charitable institution exempt from the requirement of definiteness.
Therefore, the annotator's above comments on related matters serve
chiefly to illustrate the ancillary questions which might arise in future
cases in Florida.
In the instant case, the court found that the power to designate
charities was given to the executors virtute officii; the power was not
personal and could be exercised by the person holding the office, i.e.,
the administrator c.t.a.'e As a general rule, where a power is conferred
on two or more persons, the power is given. as an expression of special
confidence in their combined judgments. Therefore, the concurrence of all
is necessary for a valid exercise of the power, unless the power is specifically granted to the donees jointly or severally. However, when a power
is granted to persons virtute oficii, and not as individuals, it may, on
the death of one or some of them, be exercised by the survivor or survivors. It has been held that when the power is impersonal, or where
the testator has not specifically provided that it shall be exercised solely
by a named executor, it is exercisable by any person succeeding to the
office to which the power is attached;' 7 however, the use of the word
executors does not per se raise the presumption that the power of appointment is impersonal.'" In the instant case, however, the court concluded
that "there is nothing in the will to indicate that the testatrix intended
that only the two persons named should make the selection."'
The following questions should be noted as requiring further clarication:
(1) Should not the concepts of power and trust be employed,
not as ends in themselves, but as means of effectuating the
desires of the testator, thus forcing the executor or the administrator c.t.a. to make a selection?
14. Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (1930); Lewis v. Gaillard, 61 Fla. 819,
56 So. 281 (1911). See 57 Am.JUR. Wills § 1146 (1947).
15. Christian Herald Ass'n v, First Nat'l Bank, 40 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1949); Lewis v.
Gaillard, 61 Fla. 819, 56 So. 281 (1911).
16. 72 C.J.S. Powers § 35 (1951).
17. Bratton v. Trust Co., 191 Ga. 49, 56, 11 S.E.2d 204, 208 (1940).
18. Id. at 210.

19. In re Serrill's
Estate, 159 So.2d 246, 249 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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(2) Would the testator's intent have been construed in this same
manner, if the ultimate recipients were non-charitable institutions, or was the virtute oficii conclusion indirectly influenced by
the favored treatment given to charities in Florida?

PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-PHYSICIAN'S DUTY
TO WARN OF POSSIBLE ADVERSE RESULTS OF
PROPOSED SURGERY IS A QUESTION FOR
THE JURY TO DETERMINE
Facts: Plaintiff, a nine-year-old boy, was suffering from dizzy spells.
The boy's mother, upon recommendation, took the boy to a neurosurgeon,
who suggested the necessity of the boy's undertaking an arteriogram, a
dangerous exploratory operation in which three per cent of the cases are
known to result in death or serious injury. The subsequent operation
resulted in the partial paralysis of the boy. The circuit court entered a
directed verdict for the neurologist. On appeal, the district court, held,
reversed and remanded: "Here there was evidence the parents were not
informed by [the defendant physician] of the dangers incident to an
operation, and there was testimony by neurosurgeons it was customary
to inform those who would make such a decision that the operation was
a dangerous procedure." Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So.2d 888, 889 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1963).
Annotator's Comments: There have been numerous treatises dealing
with the question of a patient's consent to medical procedures.' In the
past, malpractice cases in which the absence of consent was the major
issue were decided on the theory of a battery, 2 but the recent practice
has been to decide the question on the basis of the required standard of
conduct of a reasonable and prudent doctor of the same school as the
defendant doctor, acting under similar circumstances.' Courts have
recognized three forms of consent: express,4 implied-in-fact,5 and implied1. Kelly, The Physician, The Patient and The Consent, 8 KAN. L. REv. 405 (1960), is a
review of malpractice cases dealing with consent of the patient; Lund, The Doctor, The
Patient, and the Truth, 19 TENN. L. REV. 344 (1946); McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability
for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 Mn N. L. REv. 381 (1957); Powell, Consent to
Operative Procedures, 21 MD. L. REV. 189 (1961); Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1028 (1961).
2. Zaretsky v. Jacobson, 99 So.2d 730 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958); Chambers v. Nottebaum,
96 So.2d 716 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1957) ; Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906) ; Williams
v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12
(1905); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914);
Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 Pac. 96 (1913).
3. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960); McCoid, A Reappraisal of
Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MirNN. L. REv. 381 (1957).
4. Farver v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P.2d 520 (1953).
5. McGuire v. Rix, 118 Neb. 434, 225 N.W. 120 (1929).
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in-law.6 Recently the courts have become increasingly aware of the requirement that the consent be based upon adequate information as to
7
possible consequences.
In Bong v. Charles T. Miller Hospital,8 the supreme court of Minnesota recognized that a patient was entitled to know the probable facts
and results of the contemplated surgery when no immediate emergency
existed. In Mitchell v. Robinson9 a patient was given insulin treatment for
emotional illness; the court commented that convulsions were frequent
consequences of this treatment and could result in fractures. The court
subsequently held that the doctors owed their patient, who was in possession of his faculties, the duty to inform him generally of any serious
0
collateral hazards.'
The case that best illustrates the development of the "informed consent" theory of recovery is Natanson v. Kline." In that case the plaintiff,
suffering from cancer of the breast, had a left mastectomy 2 performed.
Thereafter the plaintiff was given radiation therapy and sustained injuries from radiation alleged to have been given in an excessive amount.
The plaintiff claimed that the nature and consequences of the risks of the
therapy were not properly explained to her. The court held that the physician's duty to disclose to a patient the risks of a proposed treatment
depends upon the circumstances, and the general practice followed in
such cases by the medical profession in the locality. In substance, the
decision holds that a doctor may be liable on the theory of negligence,
even though the patient voluntarily submitted to the treatment and even
though the treatment was properly administered. 8
The cases discussed above are the first to impose a concrete and
specific duty upon a physician to disclose a proposed treatment's inherent
risks. 4 Mitchell places a general duty upon physicians to inform patients
of possible serious collateral hazards. Whether this duty has been fulfilled
is a question of fact for the jury to decide without the aid of expert testi6. Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912).

7. DiFilippo v. Preston, 173 A.2d 333 (Del. 1961); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393,
350 P.2d 1096 (1960); Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1961).
8. 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958).
9. 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960); Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1017 (1961).
10. Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 19 (Mo. 1960).
11. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, opinion clarified, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
See also Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr., Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d
170 (1957); Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963). Contra, Hunt v.
Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955).
12. Amputation of the breast. See STEDMAN, MEDICAL DICTIONARY, 1961.
13. On the state of the record Dr. Kline failed in his legal duty to make a reasonable
disclosure to the appellant, who was his patient. Natanson v. Kline, 354 P.2d 670, 673
(Kan. 1960). For a result which differs because of the facts in the case, see Roberts v.
Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962).
14. It is likely that the high degrees of risk present in each of the treatments motivated
the courts in their holdings. The Mitchell rule is in fact limited to high risk situations.
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mony. Natanson limits the duty to a diclosure of those facts necessary to
form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient. The sufficiency
of the information disclosed is a question for the jury, but the Kansas
court has ordered that expert medical testimony must be utilized to
determine whether a particular disclosure comports with reasonable professional practice. However, the language in Natanson seems to indicate
that the complete failure to disclose 5establishes a prima facie breach of
duty by the physician to his patient.1
In DiFilippo v. Preston," the plaintiff was recommended to the defendant for thyroid 1 7 surgery. The surgeon failed to warn the patient
about the possible paralysis of the vocal cords, which would result in the
patient's loss of voice. Undisputed testimony proved that injuries of
this type occur about two per cent of the time, but the supreme court
affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant on the ground that the
custom of the medical profession to warn must be established by expert
medical testimony. The court found that all the experts who testified
were in agreement that it was not the practice of the surgeons in the area
to warn in similar cases.
In Florida, prior to the case of Atkins v. Humes, 8 the judicial mind
considered medical knowledge far beyond the comprehension of the
average person.' 9 The court in Atkins held that in many instances jurors
are capable of determining without the aid of expert testimony that the
negligence of a doctor was the proximate cause of the injury. As a result
of this decision it is enough to prove that, more likely than not, the doctor
was negligent.
Chambers v. Nottebaum20 was an action by a patient against a physician for trespass to the person. The plaintiff sought damages for the
permanent partial paralysis of one leg allegedly caused by the use of a
spinal anesthetic administered against the patient's express instructions.
The court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff and found that the jury
was correctly charged to the effect that a doctor may operate only with
permission and within the limits of the express instructions given by the
patient as to the type and manner of the operation, except when emergency situations require a deviation from this general rule.
15. See Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962); Govin v. Hunter, 374
P.2d 421 (Wyo. 1962).
16. 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961).
17. Denoting a gland and a cartilage of the larynx-SED Nr, MEDICAL DicToNARY,
1961.
18. 110 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1959). Prior to this decision only three Florida cases considered
a doctor analogous to any other type of expert: Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 155 Fla. 586,
21 So.2d 39 (1945); Woolin & Son, Inc. v. McKain, 110 So.2d 92 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959); and
Kovacs v. Venetian Sedan Serv., Inc., 108 So.2d 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
19. Foster v. Thornton, 113 Fla. 600, 152 So. 667 (1933).
20. 96 So.2d 716 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1957) and see cases cited therein.
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Much closer to the instant case is Zaretsky v. Jacobson.21 In that
case, the plaintiff, suffering from a paralysis of the lower part of his
body, alleged that he had agreed to submit to a hernia operation. Instead,
an aortagram was performed, which the plaintiff also claimed had been
negligently conducted. The court reversed a summary judgment for the
defendant on the ground that the issue of whether the plaintiff had consented to the diagnostic procedure was a question of fact which precluded
the rendition of a summary judgment.
The instant case was brought as an action for trespass to the person,
on the theory of a lack of informed consent to an operation. A condition
precedent to the granting of relief is the determination of whether the
injury which the plaintiff suffered was a result of a collateral hazard
of the operation, of which he was not aware and the existence of which
the doctor was under a duty to reveal. There are two views on this question. Some courts follow Mitchell v. Robinson,2 2 holding that the doctor
has the duty to reveal to his patient all foreseeable collateral effects.
Others follow Natanson v. Kline,2 8 and hold that the doctor has only a
duty to advise when good medical practice-defined by the custom of the
locality where the operation or treatment is to take place-so requires.
This latter view requires the presentation of medical testimony to determine the standard of conduct of the local physician. The instant case falls
within both views, but leaves unanswered the following questions which
the courts probably will be called upon to resolve:
(1) Is it within the purview of the Atkins decision that the jury
may determine, without the aid of medical testimony, not only
the question of proximate causation, but also the standard of
care required of a physician?
(2) Should not the plaintiff's burden of proof in informed consent cases be limited to proving that the resulting injury was a
medically foreseeable hazard, and that such hazard was serious
in nature?
GUILLERMO CASTRILLO
21. 99 So.2d 730 (Fa. 3d Dist. 1958).
22. Supra note 9.
23. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, opinion clarified, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).

